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Vehicular ad hoc networks support a wide range of promising applications including vehicular sensing networks, which enable
vehicles to cooperatively collect and transmit the aggregated traffic data for the purpose of traffic monitoring. The reported
literatures mainly focus on how to achieve the data aggregation in dynamic vehicular environment, while the security issue
especially on the authenticity and integrity of aggregation results receives less attention. In this study, we introduce a basic
aggregation scheme which could aggregate the data and the message authentication codes by using syntactic aggregation and
cryptographic aggregation. To tolerate duplicate messages and further improve the aggregation performance, we introduce a secure
probabilistic data aggregation scheme based on Flajolet-Martin sketch and sketch proof technique. We also discuss the tradeoff
between the bandwidth efficiency and the estimation accuracy. Extensive simulations and analysis demonstrate the efficiency and
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
1. Introduction
With the advancement of wireless technology, vehicular
communication networks, also known as vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs), are emerging as a promising approach
to increase road safety, efficiency, and convenience [1, 2].
Although the primary purpose of vehicular networks is to
enable communication-based automotive safety applications,
VANETs also allow a wide range of promising applications
such as traffic monitoring and data collecting, which are
regarded as an important component of future intelligent
transportation systems (ITSs). It is also observed that ris-
ing popularity of smartphones with onboard sensors (e.g.,
GPS, compass, accelerometer) and always-onmobile Internet
connections sheds light on using smartphones as a platform
for large-scale vehicular sensing. Recent reports report that
smartphone users have surpassed feature phone users in the
USA by 2012. According to figures released by IDC, 207.6
millionAndroid andApple smart-phoneswere shipped in the
fourth quarter of 2012. This further renders the possibility of
vehicular sensing.
As shown in [3–10], Departments of Transportation in the
USAmust collect various types of data (e.g., average speed or
traffic density) for traffic monitoring purposes. Traditionally,
these important data are collected by technologies such as
inductive loop detectors (ILDs), video detection systems,
acoustic tracking systems, or microwave radar sensors. How-
ever, these technologies mostly suffer from a high mainte-
nance cost. On the other hand, cooperative data collection
and dissemination in VANETs allow the traffic monitoring
performed in a more cost-effective way [11]. Specifically, each
vehicle collects its own or neighboring information (e.g., its
current speed or neighboring traffic) and then transmits it
to the remote roadside units (RSUs) via vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications.
The RSUs can be deployed at various points of interest along
the roadway and can be used to collect data from locations
up to tens of kilometers away. In this study, we coin the
vehicular networks which are designed for traffic sensing and
monitoring as the vehicular sensing networks.
One of the major challenges of vehicular sensing net-
works is high overhead of transmitted sensing data. Each
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sensing result is essentially some spatial-temporal measured
values (speed, traffic density), which record the position
of vehicles (i.e., a road segment or a small area) and the
observation time. Such sensing data is periodically broad-
casted. Upon reception of such a broadcast, the intermediate
receivers/forwarders incorporate the received data into their
local reports and then broadcast them again. Unfortunately,
such a periodical broadcast brings on a high traffic load
or even traffic storm. This problem is more serious in the
scenario of high vehicle density, which could be found on
multilaned highways in congestion situations. On the other
hand, in most cases, drivers or monitors do not need exact
individual reports, but only an overview of the general
average speed on the road ahead [12].This motivates the data
aggregation issues in vehicular networks, including Flajolet-
Martin sketch based probabilistic aggregation [13], fuzzy
aggregation [12], and others [14, 15]. However, most of them
are mainly focusing on how to achieve the data aggregation
in dynamic vehicular environment, while the security issues
on the aspect of the authenticity and integrity of aggregation
results receive less attention. Since aggregation operation
could be made by any intermediate forwarding vehicle, any
malicious attacker could easily launch the attacks towards the
data aggregation process by modifying the aggregated result
or simply inserting invalid sensing data.
Secure data aggregation is a great challenge in vehicular
sensing networks due to their unique network characteris-
tics including highly dynamic network topology, intermit-
tent connectivity, and potentially huge numbers of VANET
nodes. These unique characteristics make the secure data
aggregation in traditional wireless sensor networks such as
[16], which always assume either a static network topology
or aggregation structure, unsuitable for vehicular sensing
networks.
Therefore, to achieve secure and efficient data sensing and
collection, in this paper, we present the SAS, a secure data
aggregation scheme for vehicular sensing networks which
includes the basic scheme and advanced scheme. In the basic
scheme, it achieves efficient data andMAC authentication via
syntactic aggregation and cryptographic aggregation. How-
ever, the basic scheme needs to keep the original sensing data,
which prevents a more efficient data aggregation. Further, it
cannot work in case of the existence of duplicate messages.
Thus, to overcome this problem, we propose an advanced
scheme based on Flajolet-Martin sketch and a series of sketch
proof techniques. We also discuss the tradeoff between the
bandwidth efficiency and the estimation precision. Finally,
extensive simulations and analysis demonstrate the efficiency
and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce the related work. In Section 3, we
present the system model and the design goals. In Section 4,
we present some preliminaries. In Section 5, we present a
secure data aggregation scheme in vehicular sensing net-
works by using the syntactic aggregation and cryptographic
aggregation approach. In Section 6, we propose a probabilis-
tic data aggregation scheme. Performance analysis is given in
Section 7, followed by the conclusion in Section 8.
2. Related Work
Vehicular sensing networks represent a promising way to
cooperatively collect useful information in order to increase
road safety and driver convenience for future intelligent
transportation system. By being integrated with the tradi-
tional digitalmap system, vehicular sensing networks provide
the functionality of real-time automatic route scheduling
[14], decentralized free parking places discovery [15], traffic
monitoring [3], and so forth. In these applications, data
aggregation is necessary for efficient data propagation and
reduced transmission overhead.
There are quite a few research proposals for data aggre-
gation in vehicular sensing networks [14, 15]. Most of them
are based on group formulation and vehicle clustering,
which can dramatically reduce the communication overhead
due to the increased aggregation level. In additional to the
above proposals, the structure-free aggregation frameworks
are also proposed including Flajolet-Martin sketch-based
aggregation [13] and fuzzy aggregation [12] without defining
aggregate structures. However, the aforementioned studies
focus on the data aggregation itself but do not take the
security issues into consideration.
The most related research study for secure data aggrega-
tion inVANETs is the voting scheme, including [17, 18], which
involves multiple vehicles to collect information towards a
specific event (e.g., collision or traffic jam). Each witness (or
observer) of this eventwill submit amessage to a group leader.
The group leader will take the responsibility of collecting
more than a threshold 𝑘 of proofs from 𝑘 distinct witnesses
to prove the validity of an emergency event by the voting
scheme. References [17, 18] discuss how to further improve
the aggregation efficiency by exploiting cryptographic tools
such as onion signature [18] and aggregate signature [17].
Note that, in this study, we consider a more general data
aggregation scenario: collecting data within a certain area
and, at the same time, providing security guarantee for the
aggregation functionality.
3. System Model and Design Goal
This section describes our system model, attack model,
security assumptions, and design goals.
3.1. Network Model. In this paper, we consider a general
vehicular sensing networkmodel, which is mainly comprised
of three components: trafficmonitoring centre (TMC), RSUs,
and vehicles. As shown in Figure 1, RSUs could be selectively
deployed at some positions (e.g., intersections) to collect the
traffic information (e.g., average speed) within a certain area.
Due to high maintenance cost, RSUs could be only deployed
intermittently to reduce the deployment cost. We assume
that each vehicle, which is equipped with an on-board unit
(OBU), has the capability of data collecting and reporting.
The transmitted sensing data are propagated via V2V andV2I
communications to the RSUs, which then forward them to
the TMC. SAS is based on the distributed aggregation model
similar to [13], which does not require any group/cluster
formulation.
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Figure 1: Overview of vehicular sensing network.
3.2. Security Assumptions. We assume that each OBU either
shares a distinct secret symmetric key with TMC or obtains
a public/private key pair, which is issued by TMC. Whether
using shared secret key or public key depends on different
system requirements.
3.3. Attack Model. In this study, we assume that the TMC
and RSUs are trusted while vehicles (including the sensing
vehicles and aggregator vehicles) are potentially malicious
and can thus launch various attacks including fabricating,
duplicating, and computing the aggregation incorrectly. We
do not consider denial-of-service attacks where aggregator
vehicles fail to or refuse to provide any acceptable result.
A malicious sensor can always report an arbitrary sensing
report, which fundamentally cannot be prevented. So we do
not aim at preventing such an attack.
3.4. Design Goals
(i) Security Goal.The security goal of SAS is to enable the
TMC to verify whether an aggregate sensing report
is correct or not. Specifically, TMC should accept a
reported aggregate report if and only if it is equal to
the output of a correct execution of the aggregation
function over all of the sensing reports provided by
the qualified vehicles in the most recent epoch.
(ii) Efficiency and Effectiveness Goal.The efficiency goal of
SAS is to minimize the transmission overhead and, at
the same time, to ensure a certain sensing accuracy.
However, computational cost is not a major concern
of this paper since VANET is generally assumed to
have unlimited computational capability [17].
4. Preliminaries
4.1. One-Way Chains andMAX Protocols. One-way chain is a
widely used cryptographic primitive, which is based on a one-
way function 𝐹 and a secret seed 𝑠.The one-way function 𝐹 is
easy to compute but computationally infeasible to invert.The
chain has the sequence of values 𝐹(𝑠), 𝐹(𝐹(𝑠)), 𝐹(𝐹(𝐹(𝑠))),
. . .. Throughout this paper, we use 𝐹𝑥() to denote recursively
applying the function𝐹 for 𝑥 times.Thus, the 𝑥th value of the
sequence is 𝐹𝑥(𝑠). For example, given two positive integers
𝑚 and 𝑛, where 𝑚 < 𝑛, it is easy to compute the 𝐹𝑛(𝑠) by
functioning forward the value of 𝐹𝑚(𝑠) for (𝑛−𝑚) times with
the function 𝐹. However, it is infeasible to compute the value
of𝐹𝑚(𝑠) by functioning backward the value of𝐹𝑛(𝑠). One-way
chain has been widely used in many security topics such as
micropayment. Recently, in [16], the authors take advantage
of one-way chains to construct a MAX protocol, which
could ensure the aggregated maximum message cannot be
inflated or deflated. However, MAX protocol is not designed
for probabilistic aggregation. Further, the network topology
considered in [16] is for sensor networks with statistic
network topology. In SAS, what we consider is a dynamic
network topology and probabilistic aggregation model.
4.2. Pairing Technique. The proposed basic scheme is based
on bilinear pairing which is briefly introduced as below. Let
G be a cyclic additive group and G
𝑇
a cyclic multiplicative
group of the same prime-order 𝑞; that is, |G| = |G
𝑇
| = 𝑞.
Let 𝑔 be a generator of G and 𝑒 : G × G → G
𝑇
an efficient
admissible bilinear map with the following properties:
(i) bilinear: for 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ Z∗
𝑞
, 𝑒(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏;
(ii) nondegenerate: 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) ̸= 1.
4.3. Aggregate Signature and Batch Verification. The major
computation cost for authenticating an emergency message
comes from verifying a set of supporting signatures issued by
different emergency witnesses.The corresponding public key
certificates of the signers also need to be verified together.
All of them will incur a significant amount of transmission
and verification cost. In this study, we use aggregate signature
to reduce the transmission cost of supporting signatures,
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certificates, and batch verification to realize efficient signature
verification.
An aggregate signature is a digital signature that supports
aggregation of 𝑛 distinct signatures issued by 𝑛 distinct
signers to a single short signature [19]. This single signature
(and the 𝑛 original messages) will convince the verifier
that the 𝑛 signers indeed sign the 𝑛 original messages. In
addition to the benefit of the reduced transmission size,
aggregate signature technique supports batch verification,
which enables the receivers to quickly verify a set of digital
signatures on different messages by different signers. In this
study, we adopt the aggregate signature and batch verification
introduced in [20] as our basic cryptographic aggregation
technique to improve the aggregation performance.
5. A General Secure Data Aggregation
Framework in Vehicular Sensing Networks
In this section, we introduce a general data aggregation
framework in vehicular sensing networks by using the syn-
tactic aggregation and cryptographic aggregation approach.
5.1. System Setup. The TMC generates a tuple (𝑞, 𝑔,G,G
𝑇
, 𝑒)
as the system parameters. The TMC selects a random 𝑠𝑘 ∈
Z∗
𝑞
as its secret key and generates its public key 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑔𝑠𝑘,
by which four hash functions are formed: 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → G,
𝐻
1
: {0, 1}
∗
→ G, 𝐻
2
: {0, 1}
∗
→ G, 𝐻
3
: {0, 1}
∗
→ Z
𝑞
.
The group public key and secret key are (𝑞, 𝑔,G
1
,G
𝑇
, 𝑒, 𝑝𝑘,
𝐻,𝐻
1
, 𝐻
2
, 𝐻
3
) and 𝑠𝑘, respectively.
An important task of the setup procedure is to determine
the format of emergency report message. In our study, the
format of a secure sensing report (SSR) is defined as follows.
For a sensed event, the sensor vehicle 𝑖 will generate an SSR:
SSR
𝑖
= (ID
𝑖
,Type#, V
𝑖
, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝑖
,Cert
𝑖
) , (1)
where ID
𝑖
denotes the identity of the vehicle that generates the
claim. Type# denotes the type of SSR reported in this report.
V
𝑖
denotes the sensing value provided by 𝑖. Loc# denotes
the sensing area. epoch# denotes the sensing period. MAC
𝑖
denotes themessage authentication code generated by vehicle
𝑖 on this SSR. It has two modes: symmetric key mode (Mode
I) or public key mode (Mode II). Cert
𝑖
denotes the certificate
held by vehicle 𝑖.
For a specific event, it is reasonable to assume that the
relevant SSRs will share the same Type#, Loc#, and epoch#.
5.2. Registration. A vehicle can join the network by perform-
ing the following step depending on Mode I or Mode II.
(1) Private Key Generation for Mode I. In the symmetric
key mode, a vehicle 𝑖 can randomly choose 𝑥
𝑖
as its
secret key.
(2) Private/Public Key Generation for Mode II. In the
public key mode, a vehicle can randomly choose
𝑥
𝑖
∈ Z∗
𝑞
as its secret key and generate its public
key 𝑋
𝑗
= 𝑔
𝑥𝑗 . After ensuring the legitimacy of this
vehicle, TMC will issue the public key certificate by
signing its signature on (𝑖, 𝑋
𝑖
). Here, the certificate
generation process follows a typical Boneh, Lynn, and
Shacham signature scheme in [19]. TMC computes
ℎ
𝑖
← 𝐻(𝑖 || 𝑋
𝑖
) and 𝜎
𝑖
← ℎ
𝑥𝑖
𝑖
. Cert
𝑖
= (𝑖, 𝑋
𝑖
, 𝜎
𝑖
) is
the public key certificate of 𝑖.The verification of public
key certificate could be as follows. Given a vehicle’s
public key certificate Cert
𝑖
, ℎ
𝑖
← 𝐻(𝑖 || 𝑋
𝑖
) can be
computed, and it is accepted if 𝑒(𝜎
𝑖
, 𝑔) = 𝑒(ℎ
𝑖
, 𝑝𝑘).
5.3. SSR Generation and Broadcasting. Once an event is
sensed by one or multiple vehicles and the observation is
(Type#, Loc#, epoch#), the sensing vehicles 𝑖 | 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . .
may independently generate their SSRs as follows.
(1) Mode I SSR Generation. In terms of Mode I SSR
generation, given the type and observation time of
the emergency message TL = Type# || epoch# as
well as the location information ℓ = Loc#, a witness
vehicle 𝑖with its private key𝑥
𝑖
could computemessage
authentication code as follows:
MAC
𝑖
= 𝐻 (𝑥
𝑖
, 𝑖,Type#, Loc#, epoch#) . (2)
Thus, (𝑖,Type#, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝑖
) constitutes an
SSR claim generated by vehicle 𝑖 towards the sensing
event. After that, 𝑖 will broadcast this SSR to its
neighbors.
(2) Mode II SSR Generation. For Mode II SSR, given the
type and observation time of the emergency message
TL = Type# || epoch# as well as the location
information ℓ = Loc#, a witness vehicle with its
public and private key pairs (𝑋
𝑗
, 𝑥
𝑗
) can compute
𝑤
𝑖
← 𝐻
3
(TL || ℓ), 𝑎 ← 𝐻
1
(ℓ), 𝑏 ← 𝐻
2
(ℓ)
and generate the signature MAC
𝑖
= 𝑎
𝑥𝑖𝑏
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖 . Thus,
(𝑖,Type#, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝑖
,Cert
𝑖
) constitutes an
SSR claim generated by vehicle 𝑖 towards the sensing
event. After that, 𝑖 will broadcast this SSR to its
neighbors.
A single SSR verification can be performed as follows:
given SSR = (𝑖,Type#, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝑖
,Cert
𝑖
),
the verifier will first check the validity of certificate
included in this SSR. After that, it can check the
validity of supporting signature by computing 𝑤
𝑖
←
𝐻
3
(TL || ℓ), 𝑎 ← 𝐻
1
(ℓ), 𝑏 ← 𝐻
2
(ℓ). It is accepted if
MAC
𝑖
= 𝑎
𝑥𝑖𝑏
𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖 .
5.4. SSR Opportunistic Forwarding. In VANETs, the network
topology could be very dynamic and diversified in shape
from time to time, even sometimes sparse and frequently par-
titioned. The communication between vehicles is expected
to be performed in an opportunistic manner. This means
a vehicle can carry packets when routes do not exist but
forward the packets to the new receivers when theymove into
its vicinity [21]. To enable the opportunistic data propagation,
vehicles that are within a range 𝑟 and maintain connectivity
for a minimum time 𝑡 with each other can be arranged to
form a cluster. The detailed discussion on cluster creation
and maintenance can be found in [21]. We refer to the node
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at the head of every cluster as header, which is responsible
for forwarding the data to the next cluster in a typical
opportunistic data forwarding algorithm such as [21, 22].
The messages will be buffered at the header until they are
forwarded to the next cluster, which is also referred to as the
“Carry and forward” strategy. In this study, it is considered
that the header can also play the role of emergency message
aggregator because of the following two reasons.
(1) If taking a header of a cluster as the aggregator, the
aggregation process will be merged into a part of
data forwarding process. Therefore, there is no need
to elect another cluster head to perform the data
aggregation operations.
(2) The process of message propagation between two
clusters is referred to as a catch-up process, where
a message traverses along with its carrying vehicles
until it reaches within the radio range of the vehicle at
the end of another cluster, which obviously presents
a considerable propagation interval depending on
the speed of vehicles and the gap between clusters.
Therefore, we can use such an interval to aggregate
the related emergency messages to minimize the
aggregation latency.
In the following sections, a cluster head will be taken as
the aggregator of the cluster, whichwill perform the following
SSR aggregated authentication algorithm.
5.5. SSR Secure Aggregation. For any specific emergency
event, each aggregator maintains two local message lists,
which keep the forwarded SSRs and ReadytoForward SSRs,
respectively. The forwarded message list, denoted asF, con-
tains all the SSRs which have been forwarded by this vehicle
before, while the ReadytoForwardmessage list, denoted asR,
stores messages which have not been transmitted but can be
forwarded some time later. The SSRs setF ∪R includes all
the SSRs related to a specific event. Whenever receiving an
SSR, the aggregator should check if this SSR is a duplicate.
If yes, such an SSR will be dropped; otherwise it will be
put into the message list 𝑅. Before the forwarded propaga-
tion, the aggregator will perform the SSR aggregation (or
Aggregate SSR) and SSR batch verification (BatchVerify SSR)
operations as follows.
5.5.1. SSR Aggregation. Aggregate SSR is used to aggregate
multiple SSRs into a single SSR, which includes two steps:
syntactic aggregation step and cryptographic aggregation step.
(i) Syntactic Aggregation. For a specific event, given 𝑛
SSRs (𝑖,Type#, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝑖
,Cert
𝑖
) by vehi-
cles 1, . . . , 𝑛, we can obtain syntactically aggregated
SSR as SSRagg = (1, . . . , 𝑛,Type#, Loc#, epoch#,
MAC
1
, . . . ,MAC
𝑛
,Cert
1
, . . . ,Cert
𝑛
).
(ii) MAC Aggregation. It is used to aggregate multiple
MACs into a single MAC, which includes the follow-
ing two modes: Mode I and Mode II.
(1) Mode I Aggregation. Mode I aggregation is
MACagg = 𝐻 (𝑥1, 1,Type#, Loc#, epoch#)
⊗ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊗ 𝐻 (𝑥
𝑛
, 𝑛,Type#, Loc#, epoch#) ,
(3)
where ⊗ can be XOR operation.
(2) Mode II Aggregation. Mode II aggregation
includes the certificate aggregation Certagg ←
(𝑖, 𝑋
𝑖
, 𝜎agg) and MAC aggregation 𝜎agg ←
∏
𝑛
𝑖=1
Cert
𝑖
. MACagg ←∏
𝑛
𝑖=1
MAC
𝑖
.
After syntactic aggregation and cryptographic aggrega-
tion, we can obtain the aggregated SER as SSRagg = (1, . . . , 𝑛,
Type#, Loc#, epoch#,MACagg,Certagg).
5.5.2. SSR Batch Verification. In this section, we exploit batch
verification to further reduce the computational cost.
(i) Mode I Verification. For Mode I verification, TMC
could verify the sensing reports by verifying the
following equations:
MACagg = 𝐻 (𝑥1, 1,Type#, Loc#, epoch#)
⊗ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊗ 𝐻 (𝑥
𝑛
, 𝑛,Type#, Loc#, epoch#) .
(4)
(ii) Mode II Verification. For Mode II verification, TMC
could perform the certificate batch verification as well
as signature batch verification.
(1) Certificate Batch Verification. Given an aggre-
gated certificate Certagg ← (𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝜎agg), the
verifier accepts if 𝑒(∏𝑛
𝑖=1
𝜎
𝑖
, 𝑔) = 𝑒(∏
𝑛
𝑖=1
ℎ
𝑖
, 𝑝𝑘)
holds.
(2) Signature Batch Verification. Given MACagg, the
message set SSR
𝑖
| 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 and public
keys 𝑋
𝑖
|≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 for all the vehicles in set
V accept if 𝑒(MACagg, 𝑔) = 𝑒(𝑎,∏
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑋
𝑖
) ×
𝑒(𝑏,∏
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑋
𝑤𝑖
𝑖
).
If the batch verification holds, the aggregator will accept
SSRs in list R as valid SSRs. Then the aggregated SSR in R
will be forward propagated. Meanwhile, the aggregator will
put all the SSRs inR to message listF.
However, the previous proposed solution may face the
following two problems. Firstly, it need to carry the orig-
inal input of each sensing node for future verification.
This is because MACs authentication requires the original
input. Secondly, the duplicated message should be carefully
removed from the aggregation; otherwise many of them
will be aggregated for several times. This point is difficult
to prevent in the context of VANET, which is a typically
dynamic and distributed environment. In the next section, we
will introduce a probabilistic data aggregation scheme which
could automatically filter duplicate messages.
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6. A Probabilistic Data Aggregation Scheme
for Vehicular Sensing Networks
In this section, we firstly introduce the concept of FM sketch,
which is the foundation of probabilistic data aggregation in
vehicular networks. We then propose a secure data aggrega-
tion scheme based on our proposed sketch proof technique.
6.1. FM Sketches-Based Data Aggregation in VANETs. A
Flajolet-Martin sketch (or “FM sketch”) is a data structure
for probabilistic counting of distinct elements that has been
introduced in [23]. FM sketch represents an approximation of
a positive integer by a bit field 𝑠 = 𝑠
1
, . . . , 𝑠
𝑤
of length𝑤, where
𝑤 ≥ 1.The bit field is initialized to zero at all positions. To add
an element 𝑥 to the sketch, it is hashed by a hash function ℎ
with geometrically distributed positive integer output, where
𝑃(ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑖) = 2
−𝑖. The entry 𝑠
ℎ(𝑥)
is then set to one. After
processing all objects, FM finds the first bit of the sketch that
is still 0. Let the position of this bit be 𝑘; then the number of
distinct objects is estimated as 𝑛 = 1.29 × 2𝑘.
The variance of 𝑛 is quite significant [13], and thus, the
approximation is not very accurate. To overcome this, instead
of using only one sketch, a set of sketches can be used to
represent a single value to achieve trade-off between the
accuracy and memory. The respective technique is called
probabilistic counting with stochastic averaging (PCSA) in
[23]. With PCSA, each added element is first mapped to one
of the sketches by using an equally distributed hash function,
and it is then added there. If𝑚 sketches are used, denoted by
𝑆
1
, . . . , 𝑆
𝑚
, let 𝑎
1
, 𝑎
2
, . . . , 𝑎
𝑚
be the positions of the first 0 in
the𝑚 sketches, respectively; the estimate for the total number
of distinct items added is then given by 𝑛 = 1.29 × 2𝑘𝑎 , where
𝑘
𝑎
= (1/𝑚)∑
𝑚
𝑖=1
(𝑎
𝑖
).
Sketches can be merged to obtain the total number
of distinct elements added to any of them by a simple
bitwise OR. Important here is that, by their construction,
repeatedly combining the same sketches or adding already
present elements again does not change the results, nomatter
how often or in which order these operations occur. FM
sketch summaries are naturally composable: simply OR-ing
independently built bitmaps (e.g., over data sets 𝑎
1
and 𝑎
2
)
for the same hash function gives precisely the sketch of the
union of the underlying sets (i.e., 𝑎
1
∪ 𝑎
2
). This makes FM
sketches ideally suited for VANET aggregation.
For the purpose of discussion, let us consider a specific
application. Assume that we are interested in monitoring the
average speed within a certain area. As the first step, we use
a sketch for each road segment and approximate the sum of
speeds of vehicles within this road segment. For the second
step, we will calculate the average speed by dividing the speed
sum by the number of vehicles involved. In the following
sections, we will discuss how to generate the sketch proof and
secure sketch aggregation.
6.2. Sketch Proof Generation. According to the FM sketch
definition, given the ID 𝑖 and speed V
𝑖
, a vehicle may add
the tuples (𝑖, 1), . . . , (𝑖, V
𝑖
) to the sketch by hashing them and
setting the respective bit position ℎ(𝑖, 1), . . . , ℎ(𝑖, V
𝑖
) to 1. The
malicious attackers may launch two kinds of attacks towards
the FM sketch: inflation attack and deflation attack.
We start from three basic pieces of information that each
sensor generates in our protocol. Let Λ𝑖 = {ℓ
1
, . . . , ℓV𝑖
} denote
V
𝑖
1-bit positions generated by 𝑖. Given that 𝜓
𝑖
is the position
of first 0-bit, Λ𝑖 could be represented as the union of two
subsets Λ𝑖
𝜓𝑖
= {1, . . . , 𝜓
𝑖
− 1} and Λ𝑖
𝜓𝑖
= {ℓ
𝜓𝑖
, . . . , ℓV𝑖
}, where
ℓ
𝜓𝑖
represents the first 1-bit larger than 𝜓
𝑖
. Thus, each vehicle
𝑖 generates
(1) 𝑠+
𝑖
= {𝑖, 𝜓
𝑖
, Loc#, epoch#,MAC
𝐾𝑖
(𝜔 || Loc# ||
epoch#) | 𝜔 ∈ Λ𝑖
𝜓𝑖
}, which is called vehicle 𝑖’s
inflation-free proof. Here, Loc# and epoch# refer to
the road segment number and time slot number,
respectively.
(2) 𝑠−
𝑖
= MAC
𝐾𝑖
(Loc# || epoch#), which is called vehicle
𝑖’s deflation-free proof. This is basically the authenti-
cation code generated by the vehicle on the common
information Loc#, epoch#.
(3) 𝑠×
𝑖
= {Λ𝑖
𝜓𝑖
,MAC
𝐾𝑖
(𝜔 || Loc# || epoch#) | 𝜔 ∈ Λ𝑖
𝜓𝑖
},
which is called vehicle 𝑖’s supplement security proof.
In the following, we will introduce these three security
proofs one by one.
6.2.1. Inflation-Free Proof. Inflation-free proof is basically the
authentication code generated by the vehicles on the 1-bit
positions, which are smaller than the position of first 0. To
prevent the inflation attacks, it is sufficient to require that each
1-bit, whose position is less than 𝜓
𝑖
, should be authenticated
by a single signed value from one of the sensing vehicles that
turn it on. We define two extra operations for inflation-free
proofs.
(i) Merging Operation ⊕. Consider two sketches Λ𝑖 and
Λ
𝑗 (for simplicity of presentation, we assume 𝜓
𝑖
>
𝜓
𝑗
). Let 𝜓
𝑚
be the globally maximum value of first
0-bit after sketch merging, which corresponds to the
new Λ
𝜓𝑚
= {1, . . . , 𝜓
𝑚
− 1} and Λ
𝜓𝑚
= Λ
𝑖
∪Λ
𝑗
\ Λ
𝜓𝑚
.
We define
⊕
𝜔=𝑖,𝑗
𝑠
+
𝜓𝑤
= 𝑠
+
𝜓𝑖
∪ 𝑠
×
𝑖
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) ∪ 𝑠
×
𝑗
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) , (5)
where 𝑠×
𝑖
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) is the operation that picks up all the
supplement security proof whose positions are less
than 𝜓
𝑚
. In other words, to generate inflation-free
proof for the merged sketches, the aggregator could
first pick up the inflation-free proof 𝑠+
𝜓𝑖
of the sketch
with a higher 0-bit position 𝜓
𝑖
. For the remaining
1-bit positions 𝜓
𝑖
, . . . , 𝜓
𝑚
− 1, the aggregator could
pick up the inflation-free proofs either from 𝑠×
𝑖
or
𝑠
×
𝑗
. Note that, if a 1-bit is authenticated by multiple
MACs generated by multiple vehicles, aggregators
could choose inflation-free proof of vehicles with a
lower ID.
(ii) Aggregation Operation ⊗. The MACs of 𝑠+
𝑖
could be
further aggregated. For example, if MAC is generated
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by symmetric key-based hash function (e.g., MD5
or SHA-1), then ⊗ can be simple XOR; if MAC is
signatures, ⊗ could be achieved by using aggregate
signature technique such as [19].
With merging operation and aggregation operation, size
of inflation-free proof could be minimized to |ID| ∗ 𝑁
1−bit +
|MAC|, where |ID| and |MAC| refer to the size of vehicle ID
and MAC, respectively, and 𝑁
1−bit denotes the number of 1-
bits.
6.2.2. Deflation-Free Proof. Deflation attack is defined as that
the malicious aggregators may try to turn 1-bits into 0-bits,
removing the correspondingMACs from the security proofs.
To prevent deflation attack, SAS adopts the hash-chain-based
MAX protocol, which is introduced in [16]. The basic idea
is to construct one-way chains whose seeds are all the 𝑠−
𝑖
.
Specifically, given the one-way function 𝐹(), vehicle node 𝑖
reports to the aggregator 𝐹𝜓0(𝑠−
𝑖
). In a case of multiple sketch
aggregation, let 𝜓
𝑚
be the maximum positions observed
by the aggregator. The aggregator can obtain 𝐹𝜓𝑚(𝑠−
𝑖
) by
performing hash operations on 𝐹𝜓0(𝑠−
𝑖
) by 𝜓
𝑚
− 𝜓
0
times.
After obtaining all the𝐹𝜓𝑚(𝑠−
𝑖
), a new operation is introduced
in [16] to reduce the transmission cost, which is shown as
follows.
(i) Hash Chain Folding Operation ⊙. The aggregator
could use the folding function ⊙ to fold all the hash
chains into a single one ⊙𝐹𝜓𝑚(𝑠−
𝑖
). Obviously, due to
adoption of one-way function, it is impossible for the
attackers to generate a new security proof for𝜓
𝑖
< 𝜓
𝑚
,
which prevents the deflation attack.
Note that one-way chains should be rolled forward even
after they have been folded together with an operation like ⊙.
Therefore, it requires the one-way function to achieve homo-
morphic property in that 𝐹(𝑥
1
⊙𝑥
2
) = 𝐹(𝑥
1
)⊙𝐹(𝑥
2
).There is
a wide range of cryptographic tools such as RSA encryption
that could support such kind of homomorphic property. In
this case, ⊙ could be defined as modular multiplication.
The size of deflation-free proof is a constant number
|𝐹()|, which represents the size of one-way function output.
If choosing RSA as the cryptographic tool, |𝐹()| = 1024.
6.2.3. Supplement Security Proof. Supplement security proof
enables the aggregator to derive the new inflation-free proof
when𝜓
0
changes because of themerge of sketches.Therefore,
SAS records all 1-bits whose positions are larger than 𝜓
𝑚
and
their corresponding MACs as the supplement security proof.
Since they are not continuous, supplement security proof
cannot be aggregated. Further, we denote 𝑠×
𝑖
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) as the set
of all the supplement security proofs whose positions are not
less than 𝜓
𝑚
.
6.3. Sketch Proof Aggregation. As shown in Figure 2, multi-
ple sketches could be aggregated during their propagation
process, and sketch proofs could be aggregated along with
sketches merging. Without loss of generality, we discuss
aggregation algorithm only for two sketch proofs, and more
than two sketch aggregations can be aggregated by applying
it for multiple times.
Consider two sketchesΛ𝑖 andΛ𝑗 and their corresponding
sketch proofs 𝑠+
𝑖
, 𝑠
−
𝑖
, 𝑠
×
𝑖
and 𝑠+
𝑗
, 𝑠
−
𝑗
, 𝑠
×
𝑗
. Let 𝜓
𝑚
be the globally
maximum value of first 0-bit after sketchmerging.The sketch
proofs could be aggregated by performing the following
steps:
(i) inflation-free proof aggregation: ⊗(⊕
𝜔=𝑖,𝑗
𝑠
+
𝜓𝑤
);
(ii) deflation-free proof aggregation: ⊙
𝜔=𝑖,𝑗
𝐹
𝜓𝑚(𝑠
−
𝜔
);
(iii) supplement security proof updating:
𝑠
×
𝑖
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) ∪ 𝑠
×
𝑗
(Λ
𝜓𝑚
) . (6)
Note that such a sketch proof aggregation process could
be performed fully distributed, which means it naturally
supports hierarchical aggregation, while it does not require
any aggregation architecture.
6.4. Sketch Proof Verification and Average Calculation. After
the aggregation results and the security proof arrive at the
TMC, TMC should verify the correctness of the inflation-
free proof and deflation-free proof. To check the validity
of inflation-free proof, TMC should perform the following
operations in different MAC modes.
(i) Symmetric Key Mode. In this mode, TMC should
recalculate the MAC of each 1-bit and then aggregate
them into a single one. After that, TMC should check
if the obtained result is equal to the received one.
(ii) Signature Mode. In this mode, TMC could batch
verify the aggregated signatures by performing batch
verification technique [19].
To verify the correctness of deflation-free proof, it needs
to compute all individual 𝑠−
𝜔
and fold them together to create
the ⊙
𝜔=1,2,...
𝐹
𝜓𝑚(𝑠
−
𝜔
). The answer is accepted if and only if
the calculated result is equal to the received one. Finally, by
obtaining the 𝜓
𝑚
, the average speed could be computed as
follows:
speedaverage = 1.29 ×
2
𝜓𝑚
𝑁ID
, (7)
where𝑁ID refers to the number of vehicles involved. Similar
to the original FM sketch, the accuracy of this average
speed estimation could be further improved by introducing
multiple sketches.
6.5. Further Discussion. In this subsection, we give an
extended discussion on some issues closely related to the
proposed SAS protocol.
6.5.1. Symmetric Key versus Asymmetric Key. As we have
mentioned in Section 3, MAC in this study represents two
modes: symmetric key-based mode and asymmetric key- (or
signature-) based mode. Generally speaking, different MAC
modes have different advantages as well as disadvantages.
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Figure 2: Sketch generation and sketch proof.
From the performance point of view, symmetric key-
based MAC has the advantage on asymmetric key-based
approach in that it has shorter size and will not introduce
the computational expensive operations. Symmetric key-
based MAC is expected to play an important role in the
vehicular sensing applications where sensing information
is directly sent to the TMC since they could be processed
faster than signature-based approach and also introduce less
transmission overhead. However, on-path vehicles cannot
verify an MAC’s authenticity since only TMC shared the key
with MAC generator. On the other hand, signature-based
approach could providemany extra features such as nonrepu-
diation and public authentication. In the context of vehicular
sensing networks, it means the aggregated information could
be verified by any on-path vehicles, which allows the drivers
to have fast access to the authenticated traffic information
instead of waiting for the response of the RSUs.
6.5.2. Size of Sketch Proofs. There are three kinds of sketch
proofs for SAS. The first two sketch proofs including
inflation-free proof and deflation-free proof could be aggre-
gated and thus introduce a minimized transmission over-
head.The third sketch proof, supplement security proof, does
not support proof aggregation since they will be merged with
inflation-free proof in the future. This means supplement
security proof may incur a higher transmission overhead.
However, we argue that size of supplement security proof
is still acceptable in that, during the aggregation process,
size of supplement security proof will decrease along with
the increase of first 0-bit position 𝜓
𝑚
. In the performance
evaluation part, we will give a more detailed discussion on
the size of sketch proofs.
7. Performance Evaluations
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
SAS in terms of the resultant communication cost and
approximate accuracy. To demonstrate the superiority of
SAS, we also compare SASwith nonaggregation transmission
approach. In this part, we consider SHA-1 as the building
Table 1: The size of each component of SAS (bytes).
No SAS SAS
T&L 8 × 𝑛 8
ID 8 × 𝑛 8 × 𝑛
Data V 8 × 𝑛 0
Sketch
𝑖
0 8 × log
2
(Vmax × 𝑛)
Sketch proofs 8 × 𝑛 8 × log
2
(Vmax × 𝑛) + 136
Total size 32 × 𝑛 8 × 𝑛 + 16 × log
2
(Vmax × 𝑛) + 144
blocks of MAC. Note that asymmetric key-basedMACmode
will have a similar communication cost if we choose short
aggregate signature as the building blocks.
7.1. Transmission Overhead. One of the major advantages
of SAS is the reduction of its transmission cost. The com-
munication cost is determined by the size of aggregated
security proof including inflation-free proof, deflation-free
proof, and supplement security proof. Note that, since MAC
in this study represents two modes: symmetric key-based
mode and asymmetric key- (or signature-) based mode, here
we only discuss the symmetric key-based MAC due to page
limitation. As a typical example, we choose the 64-bits SHA-1
as the basic MAC technique and RSA-1028 as the basic one-
way function tool. Table 1 summarizes the size of different
components as well as the overall transmission overhead for
nonaggregation transmission and SAS transmission.Here, we
consider the worst case of our aggregation in that the size
of supplement security proofs is bounded by log
2
(Vmax × 𝑛)
[13], where Vmax is the maximum speed for this road segment
while 𝑛 ismaximumnumber of vehicles in this area.However,
it is important to point out that, in practice, the size for
supplement security proof should be much less than this
bound since it will decrease along with the aggregation.
By choosing different number of sketches, we obtain
the different communication cost of SAS under different
vehicle numbers as well as different sketch numbers, which
has been shown in Figure 3. It is observed that the proba-
bilistic aggregation does not show its advantage when the
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Figure 4: Standard error of SAS secure sketch.
number of vehicles is small. However, when the number
of vehicles grows, the proposed SAS aggregation scheme
could dramatically reduce the communication cost when the
sketch number is small. It is also observed that the number
of sketches plays an important role for the overall system
performance in that a small sketch number such as 4 makes
the proposed SAS have a better performance while, when the
sketches number is large such as 16, the advantage is not so
obvious. Therefore, if an acceptable accuracy is guaranteed,
the number of sketches should be as small as possible to
achieve a better performance. In the next section, we will
discuss the tradeoff of accuracy and the number of sketches.
7.2. Tradeoff of the Accuracy andNumber of Sketches. Accord-
ing to [13], PCSA yields a standard error of approximately
0.78/√𝑚. By choosing different sketch numbers, we can
obtain the corresponding standard error, which has been
plotted in Figure 4. It is observed that the standard error
decreases dramatically along with the increase of number of
sketches in the beginning while it stays relatively stable after a
specific threshold (e.g., 4 in Figure 4). However, as we pointed
out in the previous section, in the vehicular sensing networks,
a small number of sketches (e.g., 4) guarantee an acceptable
standard error (e.g., 0.39). This further demonstrates the
effectiveness of the proposed SAS.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
Vehicular sensing networks have been envisioned to play
an important role for future traffic monitoring applications.
In this study, we propose a secure and efficient aggregation
method based on FM sketch and security proofs techniques.
The extensive performance evaluations have demonstrated
the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Our future work includes implementing SAS in a specific
application scenario and evaluating its performance with
more realistic simulations or even experiments.
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